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Abstract: Hinge epistemology is concerned with a particular approach to certain 
central epistemological questions that is inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on 
knowledge, certainty, and related notions in his final notebooks, published as On 
Certainty. I here describe the version of hinge epistemology that I have articulated in 
recent work, along with its relevance to some fundamental epistemological topics. 
These topics include the problem of radical scepticism, the nature of epistemic vertigo 
and its relationship to Wittgensteinian quietism, epistemic relativism, and quasi-
fideism regarding the epistemology of religious belief.  
 
 
1 Hinge epistemology  
 
Broadly speaking, hinge epistemology is the research programme that is inspired by 
Wittgenstein’s (1969) impressionistic remarks in his final notebooks, published as 
On Certainty (=OC).i In these notebooks Wittgenstein articulates a novel account 
of the structure of rational evaluation, one that has certain fundamental ‘hinges’ at 
its heart. These are normally known in the literature as hinge propositions, but I 
prefer to call them hinge commitments, as what’s important about them on my view 
(as we will see) is not the specific propositional content that is in play (which can 
be variable), but rather the distinctive kind of commitment one has to them. 
Wittgenstein’s idea is that these hinge commitments are required in order for 
rational evaluation to occur at all. As such, however, they are themselves immune 
to rational evaluation, and hence there is a class of fundamental commitments that 
are vital for rational evaluation to occur but which do not themselves enjoy rational 
support, and so are not in the market for knowledge.  
Such a proposal is already radical enough, but what makes the view even more 
dramatic is the kind of examples that Wittgenstein offers of our hinge 
commitments. These concern those everyday claims of which we are optimally 
certain, such as the certainties enumerated by G. E. Moore (e.g., 1925; 1939), 
including, most famously, ‘I have hands’. Nothing is more certain in normal 
circumstances than that one has hands, which Moore takes as indicating that it 
enjoys a special epistemic status. In contrast, Wittgenstein contends that its 
optimal certainty means that it has no rational status whatsoever, as the hinge 
certainty associated with it is what needs to be in place in order for rational 
evaluations to occur. The same holds for the rest of our Moorean certainties, such 
as that one’s name is such-and-such (e.g., OC, §486), that one is speaking English 
(e.g., OC, §158), that one has never been to the moon (e.g., OC §117), and so on.ii 
The challenge facing any proponent of a hinge epistemology has always been 




from Wittgenstein—in such a way as to turn it into a credible epistemological 
proposal. In particular, one might initially think that this idea ultimately collapses 
into either radical scepticism or epistemic relativism. The former, because if one’s 
most basic certainties are completely lacking in rational support, then how are any 
of one beliefs supposed to amount to knowledge? The latter, because it seems 
entirely plausible for people to have different sets of hinge commitments, such as 
when they are raised in very different cultural milieus. But doesn’t this imply that 
there can be distinct systems of rational evaluation, and thereby lead to epistemic 
relativism?  
We will return to both of these challenges below. But first let me set out how 
I understand hinge epistemology.iii At the heart of my proposal is a certain view 
about the nature of hinge commitments. My account takes seriously how 
Wittgenstein describes these commitments, such that the certainty that is 
associated with our hinge commitments is visceral and pre-rational: ‘animal’, 
‘primitive’. (OC, §359, §475) I argue that there is a distinctive kind of propositional 
attitude in play here. In particular, while our hinge commitments are beliefs in a 
loose everyday sense of that term, whereby it just picks out a general endorsement 
of a proposition, they are not beliefs in the specific sense of belief that is of interest 
to epistemologists—viz., that propositional attitude that is a constituent part of 
rationally grounded knowledge. Call this more restrictive notion of belief K-apt 
belief. K-apt belief has some distinctive properties, not least that it has some base-
level conceptual connections to truth and reasons. In particular, to have a K-apt 
belief in a proposition is to have a reasons-responsive commitment to the truth of 
that proposition at least in this minimal sense: one cannot simultaneously have a 
K-apt belief while recognizing that one has no rational basis for the truth of the 
target proposition. If one continues to be committed to the truth of the target 
proposition regardless, then one’s propositional attitude is not one of K-apt belief, 
but rather a different propositional attitude entirely (such as wishful thinking, etc.,).  
Crucially, however, given the way that Wittgenstein describes our hinge 
commitments, they clearly fail this test for K-apt belief. (Henceforth, for ease of 
expression, by ‘belief’ I will specifically have K-apt belief in mind). One’s hinge 
certainty, in normal circumstances, that one has hands would not be the least bit 
affected by the recognition that one has no rational basis for the truth of this 
proposition. (Of course, one might say that it is affected, but Wittgenstein’s point is 
that one’s actual certainty, completely unchanged from before, would be manifest 
in your actions). This reflects the fact that, for Wittgenstein, such commitments 
are not rooted in ratiocination at all. Indeed, this is manifest in how we acquire our 
hinges. We are not explicitly taught them, but rather ‘swallow them down’ (OC, 
§143) with everything that we are explicitly taught, as part of the worldview that 
is thereby acquired. No-one teaches you that you have hands, for example; you are 
rather taught to do things with your hands, which presupposes their existence. (OC, 
§374)   
Notice that on my view the kind of propositional attitude in play as regards 
our hinge commitments is sui generis, as it doesn’t fall into any other category of 
propositional attitude that we are currently familiar with. For example, our hinge 
commitments are not acceptances, hypotheses, or assumptions, as these are all 
propositional attitudes that are consistent with agnosticism about the truth of the 
target proposition, and yet that cannot be true of our hinge commitments given 
that we are optimally certain of them. More generally, on my view (which I take to 
be capturing what Wittgenstein intended on this score), there is nothing remotely 
strategic about our hinge commitments either, in contrast to how they are 




While most accounts of hinge commitments emphasize the apparent relativity 
of our hinge commitments (to person, place, epoch, circumstances, and so on), I aim 
to show that all hinge commitments have a common core. For what all of our hinge 
commitments express is an overarching commitment that I call the über hinge 
commitment—viz., the certainty that one is not radically and fundamentally in 
error.v The basic idea is that the optimal certainty that is associated with the 
everyday Moorean certainties (in normal conditions), such as that one has hands, is 
an expression of this more general optimal certainty. The apparent variability in 
our hinge commitments is thus explained in terms of how the overarching über 
hinge commitment, in concert with different circumstances, and thus a different set 
of beliefs, gives rise to specific hinge commitments with more concrete 
propositional contents, such as that one has hands. It is thus the über hinge 
commitment, strictly speaking, that is presupposed in our believing, with specific 
hinge commitments a function of this general commitment manifest in concrete 
ways via one’s particular set of beliefs.  
There are numerous advantages to this account of hinge commitments, even 
aside from the obvious boon that it demystifies what has hitherto been a rather 
enigmatic notion. One chief advantage is that it can account for two features of 
hinge commitments that on the face of it are in direct tension with one another. On 
the one hand, hinge commitments are completely unresponsive to rational 
considerations, in the sense that they are commitments that we would retain, and 
be no less certain of, even if we became aware of the fact that we have no rational 
basis for their truth. In particular, our continued certainty in them would be 
manifest in our actions, so that even if we might claim to doubt them, this ‘doubt’ 
would be in an important sense fake. On the other hand, however, hinge 
commitments clearly can change over time, and change in ways that seem to be at 
least superficially rational. Indeed, the very same proposition can be at one time a 
hinge commitment and another time an ordinary belief, where this change seems 
to involve a rational response to changed circumstances. But if hinge commitments 
are unresponsive to reasons in the specific way just described, then how can they 
change at all, much less change via a rational response to changed circumstances?  
My account can explain what is going on here. Take the hinge commitment 
that one has never been to the moon. What holds this in place is that, given one’s 
system of beliefs (bearing in mind that we are here distinguishing beliefs and hinge 
commitments), this commitment is an expression of one’s commitment to the über 
hinge. But one’s beliefs can change over time, and in rational ways. Imagine now a 
child born today who over a long lifetime becomes aware of the increasing ease of 
space travel, to such an extent that it becomes the kind of activity that one could 
partake in without being aware of it. At some point the child’s beliefs about space 
travel will change to such an extent that it is no longer a hinge commitment that 
she has never been to the moon, but rather becomes instead a belief of the familiar 
kind (akin to my belief that I’ve never been to certain towns in England). As one’s 
beliefs change in response to changed circumstances, so which particular 
propositions manifest the über hinge commitment will alter accordingly. We can 
thus explain how one’s specific hinge commitments can change over time, and in 
rational ways, even though the commitment is not itself directly responsive to 
reasons (in the specific sense set out above).  
Or consider a proposition which is at one time a hinge commitment but at 
other times an ordinary belief. For example, that one has two hands is no longer a 
hinge commitment in the abnormal conditions where one is coming around in 
hospital after a major car accident. Indeed, in such circumstances, it could make 
perfect sense to base one’s beliefs on the fact that one sees them, where this would 




one’s commitments seems to be a rational response to a change in circumstances. 
On my view there is nothing puzzling about this, just as there is nothing puzzling, 
on closer inspection, about the person in the previous example who lives long 
enough to lose her hinge commitment to having never been to the moon. The 
change in circumstances, to the abnormal conditions specified, will lead to a change 
in one’s set of beliefs, and hence will also alter which specific propositions codify 
the über hinge commitment.  
Notice that on this account of hinge commitments it doesn’t follow that any 
propositional attitude of complete certainty is thereby a hinge commitment, as it 
depends on whether the propositional attitude is a manifestation of the über hinge 
commitment. I think that’s a welcome result, as we don’t want any pathological 
certainty to thereby be a hinge commitment. Relatedly, it’s not possible on this view 
for one’s hinge commitments to be in tension with one’s beliefs (as a pathological 
certainty is likely to be), since their content is determined by one’s set of beliefs.vi  
Another consequence of my account of hinge commitments that I think we 
should welcome is that philosophical claims like ‘There is an external world’ do not 
count as hinge commitments. This is because they are not manifestations of one’s 
über hinge commitment (compare one’s conviction that one has hands in this 
regard), but rather theoretical claims that we are led to make as a result of a 
philosophical investigation. This feature of my view is quite contrary to standard 
hinge epistemology proposals, which are content to treat all manner of 
philosophical claims of this kind as hinge commitments.vii But I think this is 
mistake. Indeed, it seems clear to me that Wittgenstein treated these philosophical 
claims very differently to the everyday Moorean certainties, in that the former are 
simply nonsense.viii In any case, on my view hinge commitments are deeply rooted 
in our everyday practices in a way that simply doesn’t apply to the theoretical 
claims of philosophy.    
 
2 Radical skepticism: resolving epistemic angst 
 
Like many epistemologists, one of my principal interests in engaging with hinge 
epistemology is to work out how it might be applicable to the contemporary 
problem of radical scepticism. My thesis in this regard is that hinge epistemology, 
properly understood, is the antidote to one prominent version of the contemporary 
radical sceptical puzzle that turns on the closure principle.ix According to this 
formulation, radical scepticism is a putative paradox that exposes deep tensions 
within our own epistemological concepts.  
We can express this putative paradox in terms of the following supposedly 
inconsistent triad, where throughout knowledge is to be understood as rationally 
grounded knowledge:x 
 
The Closure-Based Radical Sceptical Paradox 
(I) We have lots of everyday knowledge. 
(II) The closure principle.  
(III) We are unable to know the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses. 
 
By ‘everyday knowledge’, I just mean the kind of rationally grounded 




denial of radical scepticism as a position (i.e., radical scepticism, qua position rather 
than paradox, would involve the rejection of (I)), and so ought to be 
uncontroversial. (III) is also widely accepted, at least provided that our focus is on 
rationally grounded knowledge. For what rational basis could one possibly offer to 
exclude such a deception? To take a familiar example, what possible reason could 
one have to exclude, for example, the possibility that one is a brain-in-a-vat who is 
being ‘fed’ deceptive experiences? 
The closure principle, and thus (II), is meant to bring these two claims into 
direct conflict. I argue that for closure to be independently plausible it needs to be 
interpreted diachronically as a competent deduction principle, whereby one gains a 
belief in the consequent proposition that is based on the relevant competent 
deduction from one’s rationally grounded knowledge in the antecedent 
proposition.xi So construed, the closure principle ought to be unobjectionable. How 
could what results from such a paradigmatically rational process as competent 
deduction that draws on rationally grounded knowledge of the antecedent fail to be 
rationally grounded knowledge of the consequent? But the problem should now be 
apparent, as evidently a lot of everyday claims that one takes oneself to know entail 
the denials of radical sceptical hypotheses, and hence if the latter can never be 
known, then neither, it seems, can the former, at least while the closure principle is 
accepted. We thus have an inconsistent triad, and so one of these highly intuitive 
claims needs to go.  
I think that Wittgenstein sets out the essentials of an undercutting anti-
sceptical strategy that is applicable to this putative paradox, where by this I mean 
a proposal that demonstrates that what looks like a paradox is in fact nothing of 
the kind. In particular, an undercutting response to a putative paradox involves 
showing that the puzzle in question illicitly trades on contentious theoretical ideas 
under the guise of common sense such that, with these contentious claims removed, 
the problem disappears. (The contrast is with overriding strategies, which grant 
that there is a genuine paradox in play, but argue nonetheless that a particular 
element in the paradox should be rejected. Overriding responses to paradoxes are 
thus essentially revisionary in a way that undercutting responses are not).xii This 
is where the account of hinge commitments that I offer (following Wittgenstein) 
comes in.  
If Wittgenstein is right about our hinge commitments, then they are necessary 
features of our rational practices. That is, it is not an option that one has these 
commitments, as if they are assumptions that could be rationally discharged. 
Instead, it is essential to being a citizen of the realm of reasons at all that one has 
such commitments. One immediate consequence of this idea is that the very notion 
of there being universal rational evaluations, whereby all of one’s commitments are 
rationally evaluated all at once, is simply incoherent. I refer to this claim as the 
universality of rational evaluation thesis, and maintain that it is the source of closure-
based radical scepticism. For the role of the closure-based inference in the radical 
sceptical argument is precisely to get us to undertake a universal rational 
evaluation, by considering how the rational basis we have for our everyday beliefs 
can suffice to exclude radical sceptical hypotheses where we are radically in error. 
One might antecedently think that such universal rational evaluations are 
innocuous, as they are simply extensions of the localised rational evaluations we 
undertake in our everyday epistemic practices. Crucially, however, Wittgenstein is 
alerting us to how the locality of our everyday rational evaluations is not an 
incidental feature of these practices, as if we were merely lacking in time or 
imagination, but rather essential to what it is to undertake a rational evaluation. 
This is why Wittgenstein is undercutting the putative sceptical paradox, by 




everyday epistemic practices (the universality of rational evaluation thesis), and 
which we should discard. 
Still, one might be puzzled as to how, exactly, the Wittgensteinian 
undercutting line relates to our formulation of the radical sceptical problem set out 
above. Is the idea that the proponent of a hinge epistemology should deny the 
closure principle? It can certainly initially look that way. One has rationally 
grounded knowledge of propositions which one knows entail hinge commitments, 
and yet one is unable to know the latter. How then could the denial of the closure 
principle be avoided?xiii In contrast, I argue that hinge epistemology, properly 
understood, does not need to deny the closure principle.  
Remember that I have claimed that the closure principle, if it is to be employed 
in the formulation of the radical sceptical puzzle, needs to be understood as a 
diachronic competent deduction principle (as otherwise it is implausible for 
independent reasons). This means that it is built into the principle that one is 
acquiring a belief in the entailed proposition via a paradigmatically rational process. 
Moreover, the notion of belief in play here is clearly of the K-apt kind, given that it 
is meant to enable the subject to gain rationally grounded knowledge of the entailed 
proposition. So understood, however, the closure principle is simply inapplicable to 
our hinge commitments. In particular, one cannot use closure in order to acquire a 
K-apt belief in a hinge commitment, since one cannot have such a belief in a hinge 
commitment, much less via a paradigmatically rational route. Remember that the 
commitment is already in play, and has properties which ensure that it is a 
propositional attitude that cannot qualify as K-apt belief.  
It follows that the proper response for the hinge epistemologist to make to the 
puzzle set out above is to deny that it amounts to an inconsistent triad. The closure 
principle is not the problem; the problem is rather the universality of rational 
evaluation thesis. Once the latter is rejected then the closure principle can be 
retained and shown to be as harmless as it first appears. The point is that the closure 
principle is simply a means by which one can acquire (K-apt) beliefs via competent 
deduction from one’s rationally grounded knowledge, and thereby come to have 
further rationally grounded knowledge. But that is not going to be a process that 
is applicable to our hinge commitments, as they are not in the market for K-apt 
belief in the first place.  
One contemporary formulation of radical scepticism is thus definitively dealt 
with. Notice, however, that I only say ‘one formulation’. There is a good reason for 
this, as one of my core claims about contemporary radical scepticism is that it is not 
a single problem, but rather two logically distinct problems that have been run 
together. In particular, in addition to the closure-based formulation that we have 
already considered, there is also the underdetermination-based formulation that is 
usually taken to be at least roughly equivalent, if not simply equivalent tout court, 
with the closure-based formulation. I have argued, however, that these 
formulations of the sceptical problem are importantly different, for not only are 
they logically distinct but they trade on distinct sources.xiv Whereas the closure-
based formulation of the problem turns on the universality of rational evaluation 
thesis, as we saw above, the underdetermination-based formulation trades on a 
different idea, which I have called the insularity of reasons thesis. This is the claim 
that the rational support that one’s beliefs enjoy, even in the very best case, is 
always compatible with the widespread falsity of one’s beliefs.   
The details of underdetermination-based scepticism and how I solve it need 
not detain us here, as they take us some way away from hinge epistemology. The 
short version is that I claim we need to endorse epistemological disjunctivism in order 




problem. This is an account of perceptual knowledge such that the rational support 
it enjoys in paradigmatic conditions is factive—i.e., it entails the target 
proposition.xv As such epistemological disjunctivism uniquely offers us the 
philosophical basis to understand why the insularity of reasons thesis is not only 
false but also in tension with our everyday epistemic practices. The reason is that 
those practices are shot-through with a commitment to factive reasons, and yet 
factive reasons are clearly inconsistent with the insularity of reasons thesis. Once 
we understand why there is nothing amiss with the conception of factive reasons 
embedded in our everyday practices, then this opens the door to an undercutting 
response to the underdetermination-based radical sceptical puzzle.  
Moreover, this is not a response that can be extracted from a Wittgensteinian 
hinge epistemology alone because this only tells us about the structure of rational 
evaluation (i.e., that it essentially involves arational hinge commitments), but tells 
us nothing about the kind of rational support that our beliefs enjoy. Accordingly, 
the structure of rational evaluation could be essentially local as Wittgenstein 
maintains and one’s rational support could be essentially insular in a way that leads 
to underdetermination-based radical scepticism. We thus need epistemological 
disjunctivism to block the latter claim.xvi 
I argue that the dual nature of the sceptical problem that I have identified 
means that we should seek an integrated dual response to the problem, what I refer 
to as a biscopic response. To this end, I claim that hinge epistemology and 
epistemological disjunctivism are not just compatible anti-sceptical proposals (at 
least once one understands what their respective sceptical targets are), but also 
mutually supporting. The basic idea is that each proposal is more plausible when 
combined with the other view. So, it is easier to live with the essential locality of 
rational evaluation that hinge epistemology entails if one is also able to 
demonstrate that paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge involve factive rational 
support. And it is easier to live with the idea that paradigm cases of perceptual 
knowledge involve factive rational support, as epistemological disjunctivism 
maintains, if one embraces the essential locality of rational evaluation (because one 
is not thereby committed to the epistemic immodesty of supposing that one can 
have a factive rational basis for dismissing radical sceptical hypotheses). Note too 
the extent to which these proposals are in the same spirit, in that they both offer us 
undercutting treatments of the sceptical “paradox.”  
 
3 Epistemic vertigo and Wittgensteinian quietism 
 
Although the biscopic proposal completely undercuts contemporary radical 
scepticism, and hence is the cure for epistemic angst, I claim that nonetheless a 
perfectly natural epistemic anxiety might remain, one that is specifically related to 
the hinge epistemology aspect of the proposal. I call this phenomenon epistemic 
vertigo.xvii As the name suggests, this is meant to capture an essentially phobic 
response to one’s epistemic predicament, such that one might experience the 
epistemic vertigo even while being fully aware that the problem of radical 
scepticism has been neutralised. Just as one can suffer from vertigo when high up, 
even while fully recognizing that one is not in any danger, so I think that even after 
the problem of radical scepticism has been resolved, and hence the epistemic angst 
generated by this problem is defused, it can nonetheless be the case that one feels a 
residual unease about one’s epistemic situation.  
The reason for this disquiet is embedded in the Wittgensteinian account of the 




one’s apparently very ordinary commitments—such as that one has two hands—
can be playing a quite striking role in the system of rational evaluation. 
Wittgenstein wrote that our hinge commitments “lie apart from the route travelled 
by inquiry.” (OC, §88) He means that the question of their rational standing simply 
never arises in normal conditions, and so we are unaware that these ordinary 
commitments play an extraordinary epistemic role. Once one has inquired into their 
rational standing, however—and the stimulus for this inquiry will almost certainly 
be philosophical in nature¾then it is hard not to continue to be struck thereafter 
by their peculiarity. To employ a phrase memorably used by Stanley Cavell (1988) 
in this context, that which is most ordinary becomes ‘uncanny’ once it is made 
explicit to one.  
Another way of putting this point is that while in everyday life we do not take 
it as given that universal rational evaluations are possible—indeed, we don’t 
consider the issue at all—neither do we recognize that they are impossible. That’s 
not to say that we fail to recognize that our everyday practices of giving reasons 
for and against particular claims is local, as we surely do recognize this, at least 
implicitly. The crux of the matter is rather that our practices of rational evaluation, 
while local, also seem to be entirely open to indefinite broadenings of scope. That 
is, there seems no inherent limits to the scope of rational evaluation, even if in 
practice it is always local in nature. That there is such an inherent limit—that a 
fully general rational evaluation, one that encompassed even our hinge 
commitments, is impossible—is a philosophical discovery. Moreover, in 
discovering it, we also realize that our everyday epistemic practices disguise this 
fact.  
It is thus unsurprising, then, that even once epistemic angst has been removed, 
epistemic vertigo might well remain, for we now have a perspective on our practices 
of rational evaluation that is in a certain sense unnatural. We have, as it were, 
epistemically ‘ascended’ and adopted a vantage point that we would not normally 
adopt. From this unnatural vantage point, where one is aware that one’s most basic 
certainties are groundlessly held, epistemic vertigo is a natural response. My point 
is that one can accept that there is a genuine phenomenon of epistemic vertigo 
without thereby conceding anything of substance to the radical skeptic. Epistemic 
angst is averted¾this is no sceptical solution of radical scepticism. But as with any 
engagement with a deep philosophical problem, things are not left entirely as they 
were before. 
I have argued elsewhere that epistemic vertigo is important not only for 
understanding the nature of our engagement with the problem of radical 
scepticism, but more generally for understanding the nature of Wittgensteinian 
quietism. Unlike a straightforward form of philosophical quietism—of a kind that 
is usually attributed to Wittgenstein, in fact—the idea is precisely not that the role 
of philosophy is simply to undo the damage caused by faulty philosophical 
theorising and return us back to a state of philosophical innocence, before we 
engaged with the faulty philosophy. In particular, while Wittgenstein endorses the 
quietist idea that there is nothing essentially amiss with our everyday practices 
(nothing that philosophy can fix or improve upon anyway), it also seems clear that 
there is no return to our everyday practices once one has embarked on the 
philosophical journey. One cannot simply continue with one’s epistemic practices 
as before once one is aware of the arational nature of one’s hinge commitments. 
There is thus no return to epistemic innocence.  
In this sense, the goal of philosophy is not to simply undo philosophical 
mistakes, but rather to offer one a way of making sense of the philosophical stance 




is thus quite different from the plain form of philosophical quietism that is often 
attributed to him, in that philosophy has a kind of transformative role to play even 
despite the fact that our everyday practices are not subject to philosophical critique 
in the way that we might suppose.xviii  
Elsewhere, I have argued that this Wittgensteinian quietism, particularly as it 
is exemplified in his hinge epistemology and the associated notion of epistemic 
vertigo, can help us to understand the undoubted influence of Pyrrhonian 
scepticism on Wittgenstein’s thinking.xix Some of the parallels are straightforward, 
such as the way that Wittgenstein is suspicious of the idea of philosophy 
establishing distinctively philosophical claims, and, relatedly, that Wittgenstein 
clearly views philosophy as more of an activity than a body of doctrine. His hinge 
epistemology brings with it further points of contact, not least in how it exposes 
commitments on our part that are immune to sceptical doubt, not because of any 
philosophical justification that they possess but simply due to their role in our 
practices.  
More generally, the idea that there are no universal rational evaluations is very 
much in the spirit of the kind of perpetual inquiry embodied by the Pyrrhonian 
sceptic, whereby one aims to avoid the dogmatic conclusions of the (Academic) 
sceptic and the traditional anti-sceptic, both of whom are effectively attempting a 
universal rational evaluation of our beliefs (one that is negative and one that is 
positive, respectively, but both of them dogmatic according to the Pyrrhonian). The 
transformative aspect of epistemic vertigo is also relevant here, in that arguably the 
Pyrrhonian is also trying to find a way of gaining intellectual peace from within the 
philosophical perspective that they have ended up adopting, rather than trying to 
do the impossible and return back to a prelapsarian state where one engages in 
one’s everyday practices unreflectively and without being moved by philosophical 
concerns.xx 
 
4 Epistemic relativism 
 
One of the advantages of my interpretation of hinge epistemology is the manner in 
which it gives us the resources to resist epistemic relativism. We noted the broad 
contours of the issue above, which concerns the possibility of people having distinct 
sets of hinge commitments, and thereby having distinct epistemic systems, each 
perfectly valid. Doesn’t that possibility directly lead to epistemic relativism? I think 
this conclusion can be resisted, at least to the extent that we are concerned with a 
form of epistemic relativism that is philosophically problematic.  
Let’s take this last claim first. That there might be people who have distinct 
hinge commitments might well entail that they employ distinct, but equally valid, 
epistemic systems, and hence that epistemic relativism of some variety is true. But 
notice that the foregoing is quite compatible with the subjects concerned having 
overwhelmingly similar hinge commitments. In that case, while there might 
technically be distinct epistemic systems in play, there isn’t any obvious reason why 
disagreements between the two parties could not be rationally resolved by 
appealing to the epistemic common ground that they share.  
The point is that what really concerns us about epistemic relativism is not the 
mere possibility of there being distinct, but equally valid nonetheless, epistemic 
systems, but rather the further claim that as a result of this there is no rational way 
of resolving disagreements between the two parties. Call this latter claim epistemic 
incommensurability. Epistemic incommensurability is surely a concern, since if 




to be resolved? Big sticks perhaps? This is an issue that Wittgenstein was certainly 
aware of in On Certainty, as he explicitly raises the question of epistemic 
incommensurability in the context of the hinge epistemology that he is exploring, 
such as in his remarks on how missionaries convert natives. (OC, §611-12) The big 
question, however, is whether hinge epistemology entails a strong form of 
epistemic relativism that involves epistemic incommensurability or merely a weak 
form that doesn’t.xxi 
Standard construals of hinge commitments tend to walk right into the 
epistemic incommensurability worry since they embrace the superficially 
heterogenous nature of our hinge commitments.xxii After all, our hinge 
commitments do seem on the surface of things to be highly relative, whether to 
individuals (e.g., my name is such-and-such), to one’s cultural milieu (e.g., that one 
is speaking English), or to one’s epoch (e.g., that one has never been to the moon). 
Accordingly, one might naturally hold that there is potentially a great deal of 
divergence in one’s hinge commitments, and hence one would expect there to be 
epistemically incommensurate epistemic systems as a result.  
On my account of hinge commitments, however, this surface heterogeneity 
disguises an underlying homogeneity. At the heart of this proposal, recall, is the 
idea that everyone shares the same fundamental hinge commitment—the über 
hinge commitment—where our hinge commitments that have specific contents are 
merely manifestations, given our set of beliefs, of our über hinge commitment. Once 
we understand that this is how the specific hinge commitments are generated, then 
it becomes clear that most of the apparent divergence in hinge commitments that 
we witness is entirely superficial. For example, consider the fact that it is a hinge 
commitment for me that I am speaking English, while someone in another country, 
such as Portugal, will have the hinge commitment that they are speaking a different 
language (Portuguese). Rather than this representing a substantive difference in 
one’s hinge commitments, however, it instead simply seems to capture the fact that 
for most of us it is a hinge commitment that one is speaking the language that one 
is raised with. Many of our apparent differences in our hinge commitments are like 
this, such as that it is hinge commitment for me that my name is Duncan Pritchard, 
while your corresponding hinge commitment obviously picks out a different 
content (but we share a common hinge commitment regarding one’s name).  
In order for there to be a difference in hinge commitments that is deep and 
significant, as opposed to being merely superficial, the individuals involved would 
need to have radically different sets of beliefs. Only then would we find that the 
über hinge commitment would manifest itself in hinge commitments with specific 
contents that are fundamentally different across cases. But Wittgenstein was alert 
to this possibility, and foreclosed it.  
Although the hinge metaphor is the one that has proved dominant in the 
ensuing philosophical literature, it is perhaps not as effective in communicating 
what Wittgenstein had in mind as another metaphor that he employed: that of the 
riverbed. (OC, §§96-99) What is apt about the hinge metaphor is the idea of 
something standing fast (the hinge commitment) in order for something else to 
occur (rational evaluation). But the metaphor is imperfect because hinges can be 
moved at will, when this is clearly not what Wittgenstein had in mind when it came 
to our ‘hinge’ commitments. This deficiency is avoided in the riverbed analogy, 
where the hinges direct the course of inquiry (the river of belief), but where, over 
time, what is at one point part of the riverbed could become part of the river (and 
vice versa). As opposed to suggesting optionality, this metaphor emphasizes 
commonality (we are clearly all being swept along with the river together) and the 




place over time, often imperceptibly. (Think, for example, of how the hinge 
commitment that one has never been to the moon can change over time, as 
described above). 
This point about our shared practices generating common hinge commitments 
was also stressed by Wittgenstein in other remarks he makes regarding the 
difficulty of even making sense of radical disagreement. As he puts it: 
 
The truth of my statements is the test of my understanding of these 
statements. That is to say: if I make certain false statements, it becomes 




In order to make a mistake, a man must already judge in conformity with 
mankind. (OC, §156) 
 
But if we cannot make sense of radical divergences in our beliefs, then that would 
exclude the possibility that our shared über hinge commitment could generate 
significant differences in our hinge commitments with specific contents in virtue of 
us having radically different sets of beliefs.   
The upshot of the foregoing is that if we take Wittgenstein’s account of the 
nature of hinge commitments seriously, then there isn’t any prospect of this leading 
to a worrying form of epistemic relativism that entails the philosophically 
problematic epistemic incommensurability thesis. All we get instead is the weaker 
form of epistemic relativism that lacks this further aspect. Note that it doesn’t 
follow that there can’t be significant differences in the hinge commitments that 
people hold—indeed, we will consider one such possible divergence in a moment, 
regarding religious conviction—only that these differences cannot be so significant 




This brings me to the final point that I would like to make about my version of 
hinge epistemology, which is how it relates to the question of the rationality of 
religious belief. I’ve argued elsewhere that it is important to interpret On Certainty 
through the lens of this question. The reason for this is that a significant influence 
on the notebooks that comprise this work were the religious writings of John Henry 
Newman, particularly his Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent (1979 [1870]), in 
which Newman defends the rationality of religious belief by appealing to the 
arational role that certain basic everyday certainties play in our practices.xxiii One 
could plausibly regard Wittgenstein in On Certainty as working through the general 
implications of this idea outside of the specific context of religious belief, and in 
particular trying to determine why this idea doesn’t collapse into either a version 
of radical scepticism or else lead to an unacceptable epistemic relativism. In any 
case, given what else we know about Wittgenstein’s religious concerns, particularly 
towards the end of his life, it is entirely credible that he would be interested in 





I call the resulting view quasi-fideism, to explicitly differentiate it from the 
straightforward fideism that Wittgenstein is more often associated with.xxiv On this 
proposal, while Wittgenstein is claiming that religious conviction, at its root, is to 
be understood along arational lines as a hinge commitment (this is the fideistic 
part), he is not thereby arguing that all religious belief is to be understood 
arationally; indeed, one’s non-fundamental religious beliefs may well on this view 
enjoy a positive rational standing (which is why the view is not a straightforward 
version of fideism). Moreover, the idea is that religious belief is no different from 
ordinary non-religious belief in this regard, in that all belief, religious or otherwise, 
presupposes fundamental arational commitments.  
It is on this last front that the hinge epistemology comes in, since it enables 
the quasi-fideist to offer a version of what is known in the epistemology of religion 
as a parity argument. The parity arguments that we are familiar with in this domain 
proceed by claiming that religious belief meets the same kind of epistemic standard 
that we apply to familiar kinds of belief, such as perceptual belief, which are 
ordinarily held to be epistemically unproblematic. The upshot is that scepticism 
about the rationality of religious belief is illicitly raising the epistemic standards for 
this kind of belief.xxv The parity argument offered by quasi-fideism is rather 
different, however. The claim is not that ordinary belief is rationally grounded 
through-and-through, and that religious belief is similarly grounded. Instead, it is 
argued that while religious belief has arational religious hinge commitments at its 
core, this can’t be grounds for treating religious belief as epistemically problematic 
as all belief has arational hinge commitments at its core. A general hinge 
epistemology is thus appealed to in order to make the parity argument in defence 
of quasi-fideism stick.  
This is not the place to undertake a detailed defence of quasi-fideism, so let me 
close instead by briefly describing some of its key attractions.xxvi Quasi-fideism has 
the benefit of avoiding some of the core concerns that face straightforward forms 
of fideism, such as the worry that it effectively places religious belief in an epistemic 
ghetto, whereby it is treated in a completely different way, from an epistemic 
perspective, to all other kinds of belief. According to quasi-fideism, in contrast, the 
system of religious belief isn’t fundamentally different in terms of its rational 
structure than belief more generally.  
It is also significant that quasi-fideism represents an underexplored region of 
logical space with regard to the debate regarding the epistemology of religious 
belief, since it is significantly different to all the main proposals currently in play. 
More generally if hinge epistemology in general is appealing, then it would be 
natural to apply it to religious case, particularly if one is convinced, in line with my 
remarks in the previous section, that doing so won’t result in a troublesome form 
of epistemic relativism.  
The general plausibility of the hinge epistemology framework is also relevant 
to the suggestion that quasi-fideism offers an especially good account of the 
phenomenology of religious conviction. In particular, it is often noted that religious 
conviction bears a very different relationship to reasons than ordinary belief. The 
version of hinge epistemology that I develop is able to give expression to this idea 
in virtue of the claim that there is a distinctive propositional attitude associated 
with our hinge commitments, one that is distinct from the (K-apt) notion of belief 
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i  For some of the core texts relevant to hinge epistemology, see Strawson (1985), McGinn 
(1989), Williams (1991), Wright (2004), Coliva (2010; 2015), and Schönbaumsfeld (2016). For 
two surveys of this literature, see Pritchard (2011b; 2017b). 
ii  For further discussion of the contrast between Moore and Wittgenstein on this front, see 
Coliva (2010) and Pritchard (forthcomingd). 
iii  I develop my own version of hinge epistemology in a number of works, but see especially 
Pritchard (2015a). See also Pritchard (2005a; 2005c; 2012b; 2014a; 2016; 2018a; 2018c; 2019b).  
iv  This is especially so of the entitlement account of hinge commitments offered by Wright 
(2004) and the related extended rationality account offered by Coliva (2010; 2015). See also 
endnote 6, where I explain why hinge commitments are no aliefs.  
v  Just to clear, in calling the über hinge a commitment I am not suggesting that it is something that 
one needs to have ever explicitly considered. That one has this commitment is rather manifest 
in one’s actions. (This is true of all our hinge commitments, but for many of them it is plausible 
that one has explicitly considered the target proposition at some point). 
vi  This is one reason why the propositional attitude involved in a hinge commitment is not an 
alief, in the sense articulated by Gendler (2008). This is because one’s aliefs can be in tension 
with one’s (K-apt) beliefs, as in phobic reactions (e.g., as when one is afraid of snakes, and so 
has an alief that one is in danger, even while knowing, and thus K-apt believing, that there’s no 
danger).   
vii  Indeed, for many such theories this is explicitly cited as a virtue of the position. See, for 
example, Wright (2004) and Coliva (2010; 2014).  
viii  See especially OC, §§35-36. In this regard I follow some other commentators—such as 
Williams (2004)—in regarding the first notebook that makes up On Certainty (OC, §§1-65) as 
having very different concerns to the other three notebooks. In particular, it is largely focused 
on Moore’s (1939) ‘proof’ of an external world, and hence with his response to idealism, rather 
than with Moore’s more general treatment of everyday certainties, as found for example in 
Moore (1925).    
ix  See, especially, Pritchard (2015a, passim). See also Pritchard (2018a).  
x  I argue in some detail in Pritchard (2015a, part one) that this is the focus of the radical sceptical 
argument, at least if we wish to consider the problem in its strongest formulation. (As I also 
explain there, in making this point one is not thereby claiming that all knowledge is rationally 
grounded knowledge).  
xi  This is essentially the formulation of the closure principle that is advocated by Williamson 
(2000, 117) and Hawthorne (2005, 29). 
xii  For further discussion of undercutting and overriding responses to radical scepticism, and 
their significance, see Pritchard (2014b; 2015a, part one). In this regard, see also the 
therapeutic/theoretical distinction presented by Williams (1991, ch. 1), and the obstacle-
removing/obstacle-overcoming distinction described by Cassam (2007).   
xiii  Wittgenstein seems to be alert to something like this issue—see, e.g., OC, §183.  
xiv  This claim goes back to earlier work of mine, especially Pritchard (2005a, ch. 4; 2005b).  
xv  This proposal is rooted in the work of McDowell (e.g., 1995). I articulate my own rendering 
of epistemological disjunctivism in Pritchard (2012a). See also Pritchard (2008). 
xvi  For an opposing view in this regard, see Schönbaumsfeld (2019), who argues that 
Wittgenstein’s hinge epistemology also involves a commitment to epistemological 
disjunctivism.  




                                                                                                                                                           
xvii  The pedantic among us should feel free to rename it epistemic acrophobia, but I personally prefer 
to follow everyday usage in (incorrectly) treating ‘vertigo’ as the name for a fear of heights.  
xviii  For further discussion of Wittgensteinian quietism in this regard, see McDowell (2009) and 
Pritchard (forthcomingc).  
xix  See Pritchard (2011a; 2019c; 2019d; forthcomingc). Wittgenstein was in fact heavily influenced 
throughout his work by the Austro-Hungarian intellectual Fritz Mauthner, who adopted a 
distinctive kind of Pyrrhonism. (Mauthner receives the rare honour of being mentioned by 
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus—see Wittgenstein (1922, §4.0031)). For a very useful discussion 
of the influence of Mauthner’s work on Wittgenstein, see Sluga (2004).  
xx  I further discuss the phenomenon of epistemic vertigo, and its philosophical implications, in 
Pritchard (2019c; 2019d; forthcominga; forthcomingc). For a related position, which also draws on 
my notion of epistemic vertigo, see Gutschmidt (2019).   
xxi  I explore this distinction in more detail in Pritchard (2018d). See also Pritchard (2009; 2010; 
2019a). 
xxii  See, for example, Williams (2005; 2007).  
xxiii  For further discussion of the relationship between Newman and Wittgenstein on this front, 
see Barrett (1997), Kienzler (2006), and Pritchard (2015b). 
xxiv  See Pritchard (2011b; 2015b; 2017a; 2018b; forthcomingb). Wittgenstein seems to clearly 
endorse fideism in his earlier work, especially Wittgenstein (1966). For some key discussions 
of Wittgensteinian fideism, see Nielsen (1967) and Philips (1976). 
xxv  Parity arguments of this kind are usually associated with reformed epistemology. For some 
key defences of this view, see Alston (1982; 1986; 1991), Plantinga (1983; 2000), and 
Wolterstorff (1983). 
xxvi  I offer such a defence of quasi-fideism in Pritchard (forthcomingb), where I respond to some 
recent critiques of the view, such as that offered by de Ridder (2019). For further critical 
discussion of quasi-fideism, see di Ceglie (2017) and Gascoigne (2019).   
